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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an Appeal from a decision by the Sunset City Appeal Board, dated April 17, 
2007 to uphold a police officer's termination. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-3-1106(6)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the May 17,2007 decision of the Sunset City Appeals Board 
(the "Appeals Board"), upholding the termination of Stewart Becker ("Becker"), a Sunset 
City police officer. Becker was discharged from his job on April 4, 2007 for showing up to 
work with a 0.045 blood alcohol level in violation of Sunset Police Department Policy and 
Procedure Manual section 3-03-02.0, 1-01-04.00 and Sunset City Policy Manual section 
4.2.4 (D). Record ("R") p. 128. 
On April 5, 2007 Becker filed an appeal with the Appeals Board. R. 244. On April 
10,2007 the Appeals Board sent by Registered Mail a letter providing notice that the hearing 
on his appeal was scheduled for April 16, 2007. R. pp. 48, 157. 
On April 16,2007 this hearing was held before the Appeals Board. Becker requested 
a continuance based on inadequate notice and because he was not represented by counsel. 
He claimed that he did not receive the letter until that morning. This request was denied. 
During the hearing Becker and Ken Eborn, the Chief of Police ("Chief Eborn"), 
offered testimony and evidence. 
On April 17,2007 the Appeals Board issued a unanimous decision affirming Becker's 
termination. R. 244. 
On May 11,2007 Becker filed an appeal of the Board's decision with the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Stewart Becker ("Becker") had been a police officer for the Sunset City Police 
Department for two years. Transcript of Appeal Proceedings 7 (hereafter referred to as "T"). 
The Events of April 1, 2007 
2. On April 1, 2007 Becker was required to work a "short shift", that required 
him to get off work at 6 a.m. and report back at 2 p.m. 
3. On April 15 2007 Becker arrived on shift and met with Sergeant Arbogast 
("Arbogast"). Arbogast "immediately" smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Becker when he 
pulled up next to him. Arbogast told Becker that he could smell the alcohol on him. Officer 
Becker admitted to taking two stiff drinks with about two and one half shots of liquor in each 
before going to bed at approximately 8-9a.m. that morning. R. pp. 122,124-25. 
4. At this time Arbogast requested Becker to blow into a Portable Breath Test 
("PBT"). Initially Becker thought Arbogast was j oking, but Arbogast told him he was serious 
and went to get the PBT from his car. Becker grabbed his own PBT, which registered 0.045. 
R. p. 122. 
5. Around this time Utah State Troopers Michelle McLaughlin ("McLaughlin") 
and Arlow Hancock ("Hancock") arrived at the Sunset City Police Department to reset the 
clock on the intoxilyzer machine. 
6. Hancock approached Becker's patrol car to inspect it? because he was shortly 
going to receive the same model of car. He approached Becker and asked him how he liked 
the vehicle. Hancock "immediately noticed the odor of alcohol coming from the inside of the 
car." In addition he "found it unusual that the officer turned his head away when he talked 
to [him]." When Hancock got closer and asked Becker questions about the car," [i]t was very 
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apparent that the odor of alcohol was coming from the officer's breath. 
7. Hancock noticed that Becker was eating some mints and that he "retrieved a 
dispenser of hand sanitizer and applied a generous amount to his hands." Hancock believed 
he was doing this in an attempt to mask the odor of alcohol. 
8. Hancock "was concerned about the officer's ability to safely operate his 
vehicle and handle calls." In addition, he was "concerned about the image that an officer 
who had been drinking would portray to the public." 
9. Hancock stayed and talked to Becker while McLaughlin and Arbogast went 
inside the building. On their return, McLaughlin made eye contact with Hancock and asked 
if he had smelled what she had smelled. Hancock told her that he did. 
10. Hancock then approached Arbogast and told him that they "could smell the 
odor of alcohol very strong" from Becker. 
11. Sgt. Arbogast indicated "he was aware of the problem." Arbogast stated that 
someone was coming to pick up the officer and he was being relieved of duty for the day. In 
addition, he told them that Becker would leave his vehicle at the department. R. after 141. 
12. Arbogast expressed embarrassment at the situation. 
13. Arbogast then contacted Chief Eborn, who told him to send Becker home and 
to tell him that they would be meeting the next day to discuss disciplinary action against him. 
Pre-Termination Meeting April 2,2007 
14. On April 2, 2007 a pre-termination hearing was conducted at the Sunset 
Police Department R. p. 124. 
The Meeting with Chief Eborn April 4,2007 
15. On April 4, 2007 Becker had a meeting with Chief Eborn where he was 
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advised of his termination R. p. 128. 
16. A termination letter dated April 3,2007 was given to Becker which stated that 
the "decision to terminate [was] made as a result of [Becker] reporting for duty on April 1, 
2007 with a Blood Alcohol Content of .045 in violation of Sunset Police Department Policy 
and Procedure Manual section 3-03-02.0,1 -01-04.00 and Sunset City Policy Manual section 
4.2.4 (D).M 
17. In addition to this, the letter stated that Becker had a "right to grieve this 
decision," and that a copy of the procedure was included in the letter. 
18. The process was explained as: 1) filing a written notice of the appeal within 
10 days after the discharge; 2) Upon filing the appeal the city recorder would refer a copy to 
the Appeal Board; 3) once the Appeal Board received this, the Board would commence its 
investigation and receive evidence and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to 
the cause for the discharge. 
19. In addition the letter explained Becker's rights. 
Filing of Appeal April 5,2007 
20. On April 5, 2007 Becker filed an Appeal with the Board. R. 244. 
Notice of Hearing April 10, 2007 
21. On April 10, 2007 the Sunset City Appeals Board, by Registered Mail, sent 
Notice to Becker, informing him that the hearing on his appeal was scheduled for April 16, 
2007. R. pp. 48,157. 
22. The letter stated that the purpose of the hearing would be to determine 
whether the disciplinary action taken against Becker was justified and appropriate. And that 
in making this determination they would consider: 
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a. whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision to 
discipline employee; 
b. whether the employee was afforded due process in connection with 
the discipline; and 
c. whether the level of discipline imposed was appropriate to the 
situation. 
Hearing April 16,2007 
23. On April 16, 2007 a hearing was held before the appeals board. The Mayor 
of Sunset City, Timothy Isom, conducted the meeting. T.l. 
24. Becker requested a continuance based on inadequate notice and because he 
was not represented by counsel. T. 1. 
25. According to Becker the letter came to his house on April 10,2007. "[T]here 
was no one home to receive it so it sat in the post office." T. 1 
26. Becker stated: "Me nor my wife ever saw anything that there was a notice on 
my door. I didn't, I wasn't, I didn't even know what the letter entailed." T. 2. 
27. Becker, however, agreed to go ahead with the proceedings, stating: "I'm more 
than happy to proceed and present every bit of evidence that I've got now." T. 2 
28. Both Becker and Sunset City were given 30 minutes to present their case, 
during which, the Board members could ask questions. Then each had 15 minutes to question 
witnesses, present further evidence, and make a closing statement. T. 3 
29. Becker and the Chief of Police offered testimony. 
30. On April 17,2007 the Appeals Board issued its unanimous decision affirming 
Becker's termination. (R. 244) 
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31. On May 11, 2007 Becker filed an Appeal of the Board's decision with the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
Relevant Testimony to the level of Alcohol and the PBT 
32. Becker acknowledged that when he took the PBT the result was 0.045. R. p. 
172. 
33. On January 1,2006, Becker signed a form stating that he had "read the Sunset 
Police Department Policy Manual in its entirety", and that he had "discussed any questions 
or concerns with the Chief of Police." 
34. Becker was aware of Sunset City personnel policies 14.7.1 (h) defining being 
under the influence as having a blood alcohol content of .04 R. p. 172. 
35. Becker acknowledged a blood alcohol level of .12 before going to bed and 
going to work five hours later. R. p. 173. 
3 6. Becker acknowledged that when he spoke with McLaughlin and Hancock on 
April 1, 2007 that he used some hand sanitizer and breath mints in an attempt to help mask 
the odor of alcohol. He admitted that he felt somewhat uncomfortable and knew they would 
have noticed the odor. R. p. 122. 
3 7. Becker did not measure how much alcohol he put in each drink and admitted 
it was possible that he could have had closer to four shots per drink. T. 19 
38. In looking at the amount of alcohol Becker had in his system he stated: "You 
know, either, either way you look at by policy it, it's a state of intoxication." T. 5 
39. Becker previously acknowledged to Chief Eborn that in his usage of the PBT 
it had proven to be accurate. R. pp. 126, 173. 
40. Becker admitted "I've found them to be close to 90% accurate." T.5 
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41. Also, Becker admitted to a drinking problem stating: "Yes, I do have a 
problem with alcohol, but not in the typical sense of an alcoholic. It's more of a, it's similar 
to like someone that has become dependent on sleeping pills ..." T. 8. "[I]t's a different type 
of drinking problem." T. 10 
The Decision to Terminate Becker 
42. The decision to terminate Becker was "not made hastily", the decision was 
only made after discussing the incident with the Lieutenant and Sergeant of the department, 
the City Attorney, and David Church (who participated in policy writing for Sunset City). 
T. 17 
43. Chief Eborn stated that: "if the decision had been left solely up to me, had I 
not gone to the City Attorney, had I not gone to the League Attorney,... I would have still 
made the same decision." T. 25. "It clearly is a third level offense and I think that if you don't 
act on what the policy says, then you open the door for any other employee of this City to say 
well then I'm granted one big no-no." T.25. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant raises four (4) issues and makes three (3) points in his argument for 
overturning the decision of the Appeals Board. These can be broken down into two main 
issues; (1) did the Appeals Board abuse its discretion? and (2) was Becker denied due 
process of law? 
The answer to both of these question is "No". The Appeals board did not abuse its 
discretion, and Becker was not denied due process of law. 
The Appeals Board acted within its discretion and authority when it upheld the 
discharging of Becker by Chief Eborn, when the facts supported the charges and the charges 
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warranted the sanction. Becker registered a 0.045 on the PBT in violation of Sunset City 
regulations. The Appellant admitted to this, and there was other strong evidence of Becker 
being under the influence of alcohol. In addition, these charges also warrant the sanction 
under City personnel policies. This was a third level disciplinary action, which almost always 
leads to discharge. 
The Appeals Board did not violate Becker's right to due process by denying his 
untimely request for a postponement because Becker had constructive notice of the hearing 
through requesting it, and actual notice by registered mail, which he voluntarily failed to pick 
up. The Appeals Board, within its discretion and authority, denied the Appellant's request for 
a postponement. Becker was given an opportunity to respond to the charges, and had no 
disagreement with the facts of the case as presented. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In looking to other cases involving the review of a final order affirming an officer's 
discharge from the police department, the Court of Appeals is limited to "determining if the 
commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority." Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1012.5 (1996); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n. 908 P.2d 
871,874 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm'n. 2000 
UT App 235 (where the court of Appeals review of "the final decision of a city civil service 
commission, upholding the police chiefs termination of a police officer for conduct 
unbecoming an officer, only for the purpose of determining if the commission had abused 
its discretion or exceeded its authority.") 
"Unless city civil service commission has stepped out of arena of discretion and 
thereby crossed the law, reviewing court will affirm commission's order." U.C.A.1953, 
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§ 10-3-1012.5. Salt Lake City Corp. 908 P.2d at 875 (internal citations omitted); see e.g. 
Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm'n.. 949 P.2d 746,751 ((Utah App. 1997); Erkman 
v. Civil Service Commission of Provo City. 198 P.2d 238 (Utah 1948)(Supreme Court could 
not disturb action of city civil service commission upholding the discharge of apolice officer 
by police chief, unless decision of commission was not based on reason.) 
'"Questions regarding whether an administrative agency afforded a petitioner due 
process in its hearings are questions of law, which we review for correctness." Terry v. 
Retirement Bd.. Public Employees' Health Program, 2007 UT App 87, 9; quoting (Sierra 
Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd.. 964 P.2d 335,347 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPEALS BOARD ACTED WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY WHEN IT UPHELD 
THE DISCHARGE OF OFFICER BECKER, BECAUSE 
THE FACTS SUPPORTED THE CHARGES AND THE 
CHARGES WARRANTED THE SANCTION. 
When an employee appeals his discharge, the Appeals Board must make two 
inquiries: "(1) do the facts support the charges made by the department head, and, if so, (2) 
do the charges warrant the sanction imposed?" Kelly. 2000 UT App 235 16 quoting In re 
Discharge of Jones. 720 P.2d 1356,1361 (Utah 1986). 
In these enquiries the Board is given broad discretion and unless the "city civil service 
commission has stepped out of [the] arena of discretion and thereby crossed the law, [the] 
reviewing court will affirm commission's order." U.C.A.1953,10-3-1012.5; Salt Lake City 
Corp. 908 P.2d 871 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted). 
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In this case, the Appeals Board acted within its discretion and authority when; (1) the 
PBT was authorized by Chief Eborn who is a designee under §14.2.1; (2) the PBT was an 
acceptable test for non-criminal disciplinary action; (3) the PBT was admissible as evidence 
in the appeal hearing; (4) there was substantial evidence to support the charges; and (5) the 
charges and actions of Becker warranted the sanction imposed. These are all addressed in 
turn. 
1. The Chief Of Police who is a Designee under § 14.2.1 authorized the use 
of the PBT test. 
The Appellant contends that no one with authority authorized the use of the PBT test 
because only the City Administrative Assistant or his designee could do so. Sunset City 
Personnel, Policies and Procedures state: "All drug testing and results obtained under the 
requirements of this policy will be coordinated with and authorized by the City 
Administrative Assistant or his/her designee." § 14.2.1 (emphasis added) (hereafter referred 
to as the "Sunset Policies and Procedures"). 
Sunset City no longer has a City Administrative Assistant and it is not explained in 
the Sunset Policies and Procedures who the designee should be. Sunset City's policies leave 
the door open for City officials to coordinate or authorize drug or alcohol testing. The Sunset 
policies and Procedures clearly state, "they are not necessarily all inclusive" and that," Sunset 
City Corporation may vary from the rules/procedures listed if, in its opinion, the 
circumstances require." § 4.3.2. Surely, Sunset City wants someone to monitor the police 
department and to control their drug and alcohol testing. The Sunset policies and Procedures 
guide us by stating that "in each case of misconduct or unsatisfactory performance, the 
appropriate disciplinary action will be determined on the basis of the particular facts and 
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circumstances.1' Id. 
Chief Eborn, as the department head, is the most appropriate person for this role. 
Additionally, Sunset Policies and Procedures state that the Police Chief is the best person to 
determine whether conduct meets the requirements of the job. § 4.3.2. Section 4.3.2 states: 
"Employment with the Sunset City Cooperation is subject to meeting the performance and 
conduct requirements of the described job to the satisfaction of the department 
supervisor." (emphasis added) The department supervisor in this case is the Chief of Police. 
This Court has ruled that the most appropriate person to coordinate testing and 
discipline of the police department is the Police Chief. See Huemiller v. Ogden Civil Service 
Comm'n, 2004 UT App 375, at 4. In Huemiller, this Court held that the chief of police "must 
have the ability to manage and direct his officers and is in the best position to know whether 
their actions merit discipline." 2004 UT App 375, at 4; quoting (Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil 
Serv. Comm'n. 2000 UT App 235, 22). The role of the Chief of Police clearly makes him 
the appropriate designee under these circumstances. Chief Eborn must be able to coordinate 
drug and alcohol testing of his officers. 
Chief Eborn was aware of the PBT test and determined that it was acceptable. He did 
not do this capriciously, but he contacted other personnel and police departments to 
determine if it was acceptable. The Police Chief must be able to make this decision. It is 
allowed by the Sunset Policies and Procedures, especially since the rules are not all inclusive, 
and adapt to the given circumstances and facts of the case. 
2. The PBT was an Acceptable Test when it was used for a Non-Criminal 
Disciplinary Action. 
The Appellant claims that the definition of alcohol testing in the Sunset Policies and 
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Procedures does not include PBT tests, and therefore is unusable as a basis for disciplinary 
action. Sunset Policies and Procedures. §14.7.1(c), defines drug/alcohol testing as "an 
analysis of urine specimen provided by the employee." The Appellant claims that a PBT is 
not a urine test so it is inadmissible. However this section must be viewed in context of the 
whole of Sunset City Policies and Procedures. 
As previously discussed, the Sunset Policies and Procedures, § 4.3.2, state: "The 
procedures set out below are as complete as Sunset City can reasonably make them." Id. 
"However, they are not necessarily all inclusive." "Sunset City Corporation may vary from 
the rules/procedures listed if, in its opinion, the circumstances require." Id. 
In addition §14.7.1(c) is not the only definition given in the Sunset Policies and 
Procedures dealing with drug/alcohol tests. Section 14.7.1 (d) defines a "positive test" as any 
test result showing a blood alcohol content of .02 or greater, or the presence of any 
controlled substance in the test subject. Section 14.7.1(h) defines under the influence as an 
employee "whose test detects a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) of 0.04 or greater." 
Section 14.7.1(d) uses the words "any test." Even if the PBT test was not explicitly 
stated as a form of testing, § 4.3.2 shows that it is not all-inclusive, and the designee in 
charge of authorizing tests, Chief Eborn, authorized it. 
An officer under the influence of alcohol is a serious situation. Under this situation 
Sunset City "may vary from the rules/procedures listed if, in its opinion, the circumstances 
require." Id. When a PBT shows that an officer of the law is under the influence of alcohol, 
it cannot be discarded and ignored. 
3. The PBT was Admissible as Evidence in the Hearing 
Becker repeatedly stated that PBT tests are not admissible in court. However, Utah 
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Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1994) provides that "[njeither the Commission nor its hearing 
examiner shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence." 
The Appellant claims that R714-500-4 Regulation of the State of Utah makes this test 
inadmissible. This section states that "[a] 11 breath alcohol testing instruments employed by 
Utah law enforcement officers, to be used for evidentiary purposes, shall be approved by the 
department." This section is irrelevant since it is dealing with evidence for criminal trials and 
not the discharging of a police officer. 
Utah courts have long acknowledged the "universal acceptance of the reliability of 
[breathalyzer] evidence," Lavton City v. Watson 733 P.2d 499, 500 (Utahl987) citing 
Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah 1983). In addition, many cases have 
distinguished between the validity of, and admissibility of a PBT in a criminal proceeding 
and that of an administrative hearing, and found PBT's acceptable as evidence in 
administrative and other hearings, even though it is inadmissible in a criminal trial. See 
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Coleman. 787 So.2d 90,92 (Fla. App. 
2 Dist.,2001); Moore v. State. Motor Vehicles Div. of Oregon Dept. of Transp.. 652 P.2d 
794, 797 (Or. 1982) (where court found the case "distinguishable in that it is a criminal case 
regarding suppression or admissibility of evidence, whereas these cases present a civil review 
of the legality of administrative action") see also Frazee v. Civil Service Bd. of City of 
Oakland. 170 Cal. App. 2d 333, 334-35, 338 P.2d 943 (1st Dist. 1959); (where refusal of 
officer to comply with lie-detector test justified discharge, notwithstanding that such tests are 
not admissible in evidence in the courts of the state.); Ewtushek v. Township of Old Bridge, 
2005 WL 1583075 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), (where the court affirmed the 
termination of an officer particularly for refusing two PBTs on two separate occasions). 
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In addition, Utah courts have held PBTs admissible because "if an officer 
administering the test has any qualms as to the accuracy of the test, he is free to administer 
further tests." Layton City, 733 P.2d at 500. This is even stronger when a police officer gives 
himself a PBT. If he thinks it is inaccurate he can try a different machine or take another test 
to disprove it. This was not done in this case. Becker had used a PBT frequently and yet he 
did not, in an attempt to clear himself, take another type of test. 
Becker acknowledged to Chief Ebom that in his usage of the PBT it had proven to 
be accurate. R. pp. 126,173. Becker admitted "I've found them to be close to 90% accurate." 
T.5. 
The PBT is appropriate evidence in the non-criminal discharging of a police officer 
for being under the influence of alcohol. The courts have allowed it in administrative 
proceedings, and most persuasive in this case was the ability of the Appellant, a police 
officer, to take other tests, which he chose not to do. 
4. There Was Substantial Evidence to Support the Charge 
There was substantial evidence to support Becker's discharge. Most importantly and 
dispositive is the Appellant's own testimony. Becker admitted that when he took the PBT, 
the result was 0.045. R. p. 172. Becker acknowledged a blood alcohol level of .12 before 
going to bed and going to work five hours later. R. p. 173. He admitted that he did not 
measure how much alcohol he put in each drink and admitted it was possible that he could 
have had closer to four shots per drink. T. 19. Becker stated: "You know, either, either way 
you look at by policy it, it's a state of intoxication." T. 5. 
We have the record of three officers noticing the smell of alcohol immediately, and 
becoming concerned. The court in Holloman v. Bolen, 13 S.E.2d 881,883 (Ga. App. 1941), 
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found the testimony of several officers who noticed the defendant officer's odor and eyes, 
was sufficient evidence that the officer was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. "The 
testimony of police officers was to the effect that, from close contact with the defendant, and 
from observation and from smelling his breath and observing his eyes, he was under the 
'influence of intoxicating' liquor, but that he was not drunk." Id. This evidence "was 
sufficient to authorize the police committee to find that the defendant at the time referred to, 
had been under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Id. Becker knew that he smelled of 
alcohol and admitted that he used hand sanitizer and breath mints in an attempt to mask the 
odor of alcohol. R. p. 122. In spite of these attempts to cover up the smell three (3) officers 
noticed it immediately and became concerned. 
Also, Becker admitted to a drinking problem stating: "Yes, I do have a problem with 
alcohol, but not in the typical sense of an alcoholic. It's more of a, it's similar to like someone 
that has become dependent on sleeping pills ..." T. 8. "[Ijt's a different type of drinking 
problem." T. 10 
In the current case there was substantial evidence that Becker was under the influence 
of alcohol. The Appellant, himself, admitted it. The evidence was so strong that all six (6) 
of the Appeal Board members unanimously voted to uphold the termination. 
5» The Charges Warrant the Sanction Imposed 
Because Sunset City has a strong commitment towards maintaining a strong 
reputation, running the city efficiently, and the importance of police officers and the trust put 
in them, an officer being under the influence at work warrants his discharge. 
The commitment that Sunset City has towards its reputation, especially the police 
department, can be seen in their Policies, Regulations, and Statements. 
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1.01.01-0 Mission Statement of the Police Department 
We at the Sunset Police Department are proud of our heritage. We 
acknowledge that our reputation as an outstanding law enforcement agency 
has been accomplished through the hard work and dedication of our 
employees. 
1-01-08.00 Sunset Police Department Value Statement 
... A commitment to the highest ideals of honor and integrity to maintain the 
respect and confidence of their government officials, subordinates, the public, 
and their fellow law enforcement officers..." 
In order to achieve this the City has issued rules of conduct. 
4.3.1 Rules of Conduct 
4.3.2 Policy 
"Employment with the Sunset City Corporation is subject to meeting the 
performance and conduct requirements of the described job to the satisfaction 
of the department supervisor. Employees who fail to satisfy these 
requirements will be subject to disciplinary action which can range from 
warning notices to termination. In each case of misconduct or unsatisfactory 
performance, the appropriate disciplinary action will be determined on the 
basis of the particular facts and circumstances." 
In addition, the City of Sunset came out with a strong stance on substance abuse. 
Section 4.3.3(I)(i) states that Sunset City employees who report to work with detectable 
levels of alcohol "will be subject to disciplinary action, which may include termination." In 
1998, the City adopted a Substance Abuse Prevention Program, which once again reiterated 
that "[e]mployees of Sunset City have the responsibility to arrive at work free from the 
effects of drugs, alcohol, and other job impairing substances." 
In order to enforce these rules and procedures the City adopted a progressive 
disciplinary system: 
4.2.4 Employee Discipline 
a. Sunset City is committed to a fair and equitable progressive disciplinary 
system. Management has both the right and responsibility to correct and/or 
discipline staff for misconduct, errors or inappropriate behavior or actions 
which adversely affect the operations and/or the reputation of Sunset City, 
d. Third level offenses are the most serious offenses and may result in 
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discharge after the first offense. Examples of third-level offenses are: 
1. Working or being on the job while under the influence of alcohol, 
narcotics, or other drugs; 
e. Discipline Procedure 
3. Third Level Offenses 
a. Third level offenses are the most serious offenses and usually lead to 
termination. 
(emphasis added) 
Due to the importance of substance abuse control, and the image and role that the police play 
in the community, it was proper for Chief Eborn to discharge Becker. 
This Court has held that the police chief has the discretion of how to proceed in 
disciplining an officer, "because the police chief must have the ability to manage and direct 
his officers, and the police chief [is] in the best position to know whether the officer's actions 
merited discipline." Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, 22 see also fHuemiller 2004 UT App 375,4). 
There are several cases of officers being let go for being under the influence but not 
intoxicated, even when not showing up for duty. See e.g. Becker v. Merrill 20 So. 2d 912 
(Fla. 1944) (The court held that a city police chief, while in uniform, but not on duty, and 
under the influence of intoxicants, but not intoxicated when involved in an accident, was 
guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer, and discharge was appropriate.). Courts have even 
gone as far as not requiring that the officer's conduct even violate a particular rule. See 
Appeal of Emmons, 164 A.2d 184,187 (App. Div. 1960) ("Nor need a finding of misconduct 
be predicated upon the violation of any particular rule or regulation, but may be based merely 
upon the violation of the implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one who 
stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is morally and legally correct.") 
Chief Eborn, in his testimony, stated that the decision to terminate Becker was "not 
made hastily", the decision was only made after discussing the incident with the Lieutenant 
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and Sergeant of the police department, the City Attorney, and David Church (who 
participated in policy writing for Sunset City). T. 17. 
Chief Eborn stated that: "if the decision had been left solely up to me, had I not gone 
to the City Attorney, had I not gone to the League Attorney,... I would have still made the 
same decision." T. 25. "It clearly is a third level offense and I think that if you don't act on 
what the policy says, then you open the door for any other employee of this City to say well 
then I'm granted one big no-no." T.25. 
Chief Eborn appropriately used his discretion and discharged Becker. It was a serious 
third level offense, and he felt he had to make that decision. 
POINT II 
THE APPEALS BOARD DID NOT VIOLATE 
BECKER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BECAUSE 
BECKER RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE HEARING, 
HIS REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE WAS NOT 
TIMELY, HE WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
RESPOND TO THE CHARGES, AND THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE IN THIS CONTEXT ARE DIFFERENT 
THAN IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Although the exact requirements of due process may vary from situation to situation, 
the minimum requirements of due process include adequate notice and an opportunity to be 
heard in a meaningful manner. Dairy Prod. Serv. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81 49. "To 
be considered a meaningful hearing, the concerns of the affected parties should be heard by 
an impartial decision maker." Dairy Prod. Serv., 2000 UT 81 at 49. 
To guide them in the discipline of employees the City of Sunset adopted the 
following regulation: 
10-3-1106 Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer 
-Appeals - Board - Procedure. 
(4) An employee who is the subject of discharge, suspension, or transfer may: 
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(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel; (b) have a public hearing; 
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and (d) examine 
the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(5)(a)(i) Each decision for the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall 
be certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred 
to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii) 
(emphasis added) 
The Appellant claims that he did not receive due process of law. However, (1) Becker 
received actual notice, and/or constructive notice; (2) the Board of Appeals appropriately and 
within its discretion denied an untimely request for a continuance; (3) the rules of evidence 
in the appeals hearing allowed the PBT and other evidence; (4) Becker confronted his 
accuser, Chief Ebora and Becker himself admitted to the PBT results. 
1. Becker Received Notice 
"Due process requires the government to provide 'notice reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections.'" Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 
(2006); quoting (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 
"Due process does not require that a property owner receive actual notice before the 
government may take his property." Jones, 547 U.S. at 226; citing fDusenbery v. United 
States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002). 
The Appellant cites Jones as showing that notice was not served in the current case. 
However, in Jones it is found that even if there is no actual notice, due process has been 
served if the methods were reasonable. Jones, 547 U.S. at 226. The means of contacting 
Becker in the current case were reasonable under the circumstances. In this case it was 
registered mail to the Appellant's Home. 
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Becker had actual and constructive notice of the hearing. He filed the Appeal 
knowing that there were only 15 days for the Appeals Board to act; he knew what the appeal 
was for. The courts have long held; 
Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard 
and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have 
led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall 
be deemed conversant of it. 
Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Courtesy Motors. Inc., 333 P.2d 628, 629 (1959); quoting (Wood 
Y, Carpenter. 101 U.S. 135, 141 (1879)). 
The presumption is that if the party affected... might, with ordinary care and 
attention, have seasonably detected it, he seasonably had actual knowledge 
of it. 
Wood, 101 U.S. at 141 (Emphasis Added). 
At the very least, Becker had constructive notice and was aware of the hearing 
because he requested it. He knew the subject matter of the hearing. He knew he had the right 
to counsel. He knew the Board decision had to be made within 15 days from the time of the 
referral (policy 1-15-4). On top of this, Becker received notice of a registered letter and 
voluntarily failed to pick it up. 
In addition, there was no harm to Becker because of the mode of notice. In Lucas the 
court in analyzing the ineffectiveness of the notice found that still Lucas had not established 
"how these procedural errors were harmful, e.g., he did not have time to prepare for the 
hearing or, how these procedures would have resulted in a different outcome absent such 
errors. Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746,755 (Utah App. 1997) see, 
e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) cf. State v. Knight 734 
P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987) (M[T]he likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently 
high to undermine confidence in [the decision]."); State v. Villarreal 857 P.2d 949, 958 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating evidence must be "sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude 
there is no 'reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings' " 
(quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)), aff d, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). 
Becker knew that he did not have much time to meet with a lawyer, yet he put it off until a 
few days before the 15-day period expired. Even if he had received the letter, he still had his 
appointment set for after the hearing. 
Becker had actual and constructive notice of the hearing. Becker received actual 
notice through a registered letter, which, once again, he voluntarily failed to pick up. He had 
constructive notice because he filed the appeal knowing that there were only 15 days for the 
Appeals Board to act; he knew what the appeal was for, he knew what the charges were. 
Becker's failure to prepare sufficiently does not remove the fact that he had sufficient notice 
of the hearing. 
2. The Appeals Board within its Discretion and Authority, Denied the 
Appellant's request for a Continuance. 
Sunset City regulations state that "[f]or good cause the board may extend the 15-day 
period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and municipality 
both consent." (5)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). This states that for good cause the Appeals Board 
may extend the deadline. However, trial courts have a great deal of discretion in granting a 
continuance, and this discretion should be even greater in administrative dealings. Brown v. 
Glover, clearly explains the standard for discretion in granting continuances. 
However, "[t]rial courts have substantial discretion in deciding whether 
to grant continuances," Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375,1377 (Utah 
1988), and their decision will not be overturned unless that discretion has 
been clearly abused, see State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408,413 (Utah 1993). 
Furthermore, a party is not necessarily entitled to a continuance because 
counsel is unable to be present on the date set for trial. See Griffiths v. 
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Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977); see also Lundgreen v.. 
Lundgreen, 184 P.2d 670, 671-72 (1947) (affirming denial of continuance 
when attorney in law firm had conflict and claimed no other members of firm 
could familiarize themselves in adequate time); 16 P.3d 540, 548 -549 
(Utah,2000) (emphasis added) 
The Appellant correctly states that good cause is a "special circumstance" that was 
beyond the party's control. In re General Determination of Rights to Use of Water, 2008 UT 
25, 35; citing (Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106, 41). However, in the current 
case there was no good cause. The Appellant knew of the pendency of the hearing before the 
Appeals Board, he should have been preparing for it during this time. In any case, he had the 
ability to contact the City sooner to find out the date of the hearing. He knew there would 
soon be a hearing, but he did not actually retain a lawyer to represent him. 
In addition, like a trial court, the Appeals Board has " substantial discretion in 
deciding whether to grant continuances and will not be reversed on appeal unless it has 
abused that discretion by acting unreasonably." Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585,586 (Utah 
App.1993) quoting Hill v. Dickerson. 839 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah App.1992) (citations 
omitted). 
The Appeals Board is the best judge of the reason for not granting a continuance and 
in determining the credibility of the Appellant in his testimony. During the hearing, Becker 
made several confusing statements that the Appeals Board had to interpret. For example, 
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Becker confusingly stated: "Me nor my wife ever saw anything that there was a notice on my 
door. I didn't, I wasn't, I didn't even know what the letter entailed." T. 2. 
In addition to his confusing statements, Becker agreed to go ahead with the 
proceedings, stating: "I'm more than happy to proceed and present every bit of evidence that 
I've got now." T. 2 
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According to long held precedent, it is well within the discretion and authority of the 
Appeals Board to deny a continuance, especially when no good cause is shown. 
3. Hearsay Evidence is Allowed in the Appeals Board Hearings 
In Point Two of the Appellant's brief the Appellant claims that PBT is a written 
statement within Section 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and Hearsay. 
However Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1994) provides that "[njeither the Commission nor its 
hearing examiner shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence." 
Therefore, hearsay evidence, even if objected to, is admissible in an administrative hearing 
before the Commission. Industrial Power Contractors v. Industrial Comm'n, 832 P.2d 477, 
478 (Utah App.1992). However, the Commission's findings of fact "cannot be based 
exclusively on hearsay evidence." Industrial Power Contractors, 832 P.2d at 479; citing 
Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984) (emphasis 
in original). To support the Commission's findings, "there must be a residuum of evidence, 
legal and competent in a court of law." Industrial Power Contractors, 832 P.2d at 479; 
quoting Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n. 358 P.2d 899, 901 (Utah 1961). 
There was substantial evidence presented to easily fulfill this small requirement of 
having a "residuum of evidence." See Supra 4. There was substantial evidence of the charge. 
Most importantly we have Becker's own admission that he blew a 0.045 on the PBT; together 
with his admission of drinking, his efforts to mask the odor and the observations of three (3) 
police officers. Since the Utah Rules of Evidence do not apply in this situation, this 
evidence is admissible. 
4. Confronting Witnesses 
As previously discussed, the minimum requirements of due process include adequate 
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notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Dairy Prod. Serv., 2000 UT 
81 at 49. "To be considered a meaningful hearing, the concerns of the affected parties should 
be heard by an impartial decision maker." Dairy Prod. Serv., 2000 UT 81 at 49. This was 
granted to Becker. Becker was heard by the Appeals board and had sufficient time to make 
his case. In addition there is not even a hint that Becker wanted to confront any of the officers 
on their reports or testimony. Becker knew that he had blown a 0.045 on the PBT, he merely 
argued that it was inadmissible, and that discharge was a severe punishment. Nowhere did 
he state or even imply that he thought any of the officers lied or left out important details of 
incident. In all the record there is no assertion of bias in the firing or of any of the officers 
lying. Becker merely argued against the policies. Becker's recollection of the events did not 
conflict at all with that of the officer's reports and Becker never contested any of them. Most 
importantly, Becker admitted that when he took the PBT, the result was 0.045. R. p. 172. 
Becker stated: "You know, either, either way you look at by policy it, it's a state of 
intoxication." Furthermore, he confronted and cross-examined Chief Eborn, his accuser who 
made the decision to discharge him. 
Becker did not show how any of his complaints resulted in harm to him. 
CONCLUSION 
Becker was under the influence of alcohol when he showed up to work on the 
afternoon of April 1, 2007. Because of this, he was discharged pursuant to the Policies and 
Procedures of Sunset City. The Appeals Board acted within its discretion and authority when 
it upheld the discharging of Becker by Chief Eborn. Becker admitted to having blown a 
0.045 in violation of Sunset City regulations. In addition the Appellant admitted this guilt 
and admitted to being over the limit on the PBT. This was a third level disciplinary action, 
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which almost always leads to discharge, as it did with Becker. 
In addition, the Appeals Board did not violate Becker's right to due process when 
Becker received notice of the hearing, through requesting it, and by registered mail, which 
he failed to pick up. The Appeals Board within its discretion and authority denied the 
Appellant's untimely request for a continuance. 
Becker was given an opportunity to respond to the charges. Statements of the PBT 
were admissible since the rules of evidence in this context are different than in judicial 
proceedings. Becker admitted to having blown a 0.045 in violation of Sunset City 
regulations and was therefore discharged. 
In light of the preceding arguments, this Court should rule in favor of the City and 
uphold the decision of the Sunset City Board of Appeals to uphold the discharge of Becker. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on 22nd day of December, 2008. 
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